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SOCIAL SEXUAL CONDUCT AT WORK: How Do WORKERS
KNOw WHEN IT IS HARASSMENT AND WHEN IT IS NOT?
RICHARD L. WIENER*
LINDA E. HURT **
Alice and Bob are coworkers who have separate desks that face each
other in a somewhat isolated area of the office. Alice notices that Bob, her
coworker, is doing that silly thing with his pen again. He sucks on the pen,
removes it from his mouth, points it toward her desk and then puts it back in
his mouth. When he sees Alice look up, Bob tosses his head in a friendly
kind of way and offers her a smile and a barely audible giggle. Alice
quickly looks down at her desk and goes back to work but she feels humili-
ated by Bob's uninvited attention. Alice would like him to stop this silly
behavior. Alice is very concerned that some of her other coworkers will no-
tice his attentions and rumors will fly. It is so difficult to know what to do.
Should she report the conduct to her boss and make a complaint or should
she ignore it and hope he eventually stops? Alice does not feel comfortable
confronting Bob. Alice decides to ask Jane, her best friend at work, for
some advice.
While many have written on the thorny and imprecise issues surround-
ing sexual harassment complaints at work, fewer have considered the fun-
damental question upon which that debate should rest, "How do workers de-
cide when social sexual behavior is harassing?" The theme of this essay is
that employer action, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") response, litigation, and ultimately legal doctrine should start
with some understanding of the answer to this question. We do not suggest
that there is an absolute answer to the substantive issue of what conduct is
harassing and what conduct is not harassing. Instead we focus on the judg-
ment process that men and women use to determine the status of social sex-
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ual behavior at work. To this end, we report on open ended interviews so-
liciting opinions on workplace relations that we conducted with 50 full time
employees (25 women and 25 men) who answered newspaper advertise-
ments.
Consider the decision process of one female interviewee, Number 12.
During a 90 minute semi-structured interview, she outlined her decision
process for harassing, nonharassing, and ambiguous behavior. With regard
to sexual innuendo, she explained that she first looks to see if the target
woman is alone. If the woman is in a group, then sexual innuendo is not
harassment. However, if the woman is alone, then interviewee Number 12
examines the intent of the man who engages in the action. If she believes
his intention is friendly then the conduct is not harassment. On the other
hand, if she believes the intention of the man is other than friendly, she asks
whether or not the woman has asked the man to stop the behavior. Inter-
viewee Number 12 believes that sexual innuendo is harassment only if a
woman is alone when it occurs, if the man acts with intention that is other
than fTiendly, and if he continues to engage in the conduct after the woman
has asked him to stop.
Assume that in the above scenario, Jane, the complainant's coworker is
interviewee Number 12. It is likely that Jane would not perceive Bob's
conduct as harassing. Although Alice is alone when Bob pulls out his pen
and Jane may agree with Alice that the conduct is not motivated by friendly
intentions, she would still advise Alice to confront Bob and ask him to stop
before taking any further action. According to Jane, the dispositive decision
point in the scenario is that Bob has not been told to stop and harassment re-
sults only when sexual innuendo occurs after the initiator has refused to stop
when asked.
This essay examines social sexual conduct at work from the vantage
point of the empirical questions that are implied in the law. Part I reviews
federal law that regulates social sexual conduct in the workplace, especially
the legal doctrine that makes available hostile work environment causes of
action as the remedy for illegal gender discrimination. The paper discusses
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the regulatory rules promulgated by the
EEOC, and case law that determines the rules of conduct that employers are
required to enforce at work. We review this well discussed body of law
with an eye for psychological assumptions which shape the rules and tests
that make up the regulations. It is our position that there is much to be
gained by questioning these assumptions and collecting empirical data to
test them. Our review comments on two controversies in current hostile
work environment policy: the requirement that the social sexual conduct is
unwelcome and the standard by which social sexual conduct is measured.
In evaluating these controversies, we focus on the subjective quality of hos-
tile work environment judgments.
Part II of this essay introduces social analytic jurisprudence as a tool for
exploring the psychological implications of hostile work environment law.
[Vol. 34
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Accordingly, psycholegal research begins with a detailed analysis of an area
of law and proceeds with a psychological analysis of those elements of law
that permit empirical inquiry. Upon identifying empirical questions, the
analyst applies psychological theories, research results and methodologies
to answer them. If adequate psychological knowledge is available to satisfy
the inquiry, the inquiry stops. More likely, the analyst will uncover signifi-
cant gaps in psychological knowledge as it applies to specific legal issues
and will need to design additional empirical studies to probe or test the psy-
cholegal principles that go to the substantive doctrine. The powerful and
diverse methodologies available to the social scientist can be used to gather
additional data that speak directly to the legal dispute.
We describe how psycholegal scholars can apply social analytic juris-
prudence to study the gaps between the law and the manner in which people
evaluate their everyday social interactions (i.e., the adjustment or assess-
ment function), to investigate the implementation of legal doctrine within
legal institutions themselves (i.e., the implementation function), and to
measure the impact of the law on the lives of people in their everyday lives
(i.e., the evaluative function). We describe the role of each of these types of
inquiry in the regulation of social sexual conduct in the workplace and sug-
gest the types of investigations that will be both scientifically useful and le-
gally meaningful.
Controversies in hostile work environment doctrine rest upon policy
questions whose potential answers assume a great deal about human con-
duct in and out of the workplace. This essay explains that the debate lacks a
body of data that address these assumptions. We argue that the controversies
focus on the manner in which women and men evaluate social sexual con-
duct at work, and that suggested policy changes offered in the literature rest
upon intuitive models of processes that men and women use to judge the
offensiveness of such conduct.
In Part III we demonstrate how we would supplement and correct the
intuitive data base with empirical evidence gathered using a qualitative and
quantitative research paradigm. Our data begin to map the judgment proc-
esses of employees working in settings similar to those that complainants
and alleged perpetrators inhabit. The methodology consists of open ended
interviews during which investigators ask employees questions about the
types of social sexual conduct they experience at work and whether or not
the employees find the conduct to be harassing. Using flow charts, we
break conclusions into the cognitive steps and decision points employees
traverse to reach their final judgments. The analysis of the decision process
goes a long way toward making explicit the rules and principles that men
and women apply to social sexual conduct in the workplace. Part III of this
essay presents some preliminary results of our research in both graphic and
statistical form.
Part IV summarizes the judgment policies that we discovered in our
interviews with male and female workers. We describe the important deci-
19971
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sion points that are common and unicue to men and women. This section
discusses the notion of a rational decision policy and the implications of
such a policy for both of the controversies outlined in the earlier sections of
the essay. Part IV discusses some of the limitations of our work and sug-
gests both avenues for future investigation and policy implications of our
preliminary results.
I. FEDERAL LAW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1991 prohibits
an employer from discriminating against an individual with respect to com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.1 The courts have interpreted Title
VII's prohibition against gender discrimination to mean that employers may
not exact sexual contact in exchange for compensation or advancement nor
may they subject women workers to an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment The legal theory underlying the first type of inter-
diction, commonly referred to as quid pro quo harassment,4 is well settled
law. The focus of this paper is on the hostile work environment theory5
which underlies the second type of prohibition.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court recognized that
"the language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' dis-
crimination."6 Instead, the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" shows that it was the intent of Congress to "'strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." 7 The
plaintiff in the case, Mechelle Vinson worked in the same branch of Meritor
Savings Bank for four years. During that time she was promoted on her
work record from teller, to head teller, and subsequently to assistant branch
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a)(1) (1997). The revised Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the
earlier law by allowing for punitive damages in cases where the "respondent engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1997). Af-
ter the 1991 revision of Title VII, "any party may demand a trial by jury .... " Id
2. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of Am.,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
3. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
4. See Henson, 682F.2d at 911 n.22; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1997).
5. See Meritor, 447 U.S. at 65; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)(1990).
6. See Mentor, 447 U.S. at 64.
7. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194,1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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manager.8 She complained that Sidney Taylor, a vice president of the bank,
invited her out to dinner and during the meal asked her to go to a motel to
have sex with him. Vinson refused his initial invitation but eventually gave
in to him because she feared losing her position if she did not succumb.9
Over the years Vinson had sexual intercourse with Taylor on many occa-
sions. She claimed that Taylor fondled her at work in front of other work-
ers, followed her into the rest room, and even raped her at work." Vinson
did not complain about these incidents at the time that they occurred. She
claimed that she failed to do so because she feared Taylor." The district
court held that Vinson and Taylor had engaged in a consensual sexual rela-
tionship and therefore Vinson had not been discriminated against because of
her sex.12 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
holding that through the actions of its vice president the bank had subjected
Vinson to an abusive working environment. 3 The court also held that Title
VII prohibited the bank from subjecting employees to abusive work envi-
ronments based on their gender.'4 However, on grant of certiorari, the Su-
preme Court upheld the hostile work environment theory stating that har-
assment affects a term, condition or privilege of employment if it is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment."' 5
The Meritor court relied heavily on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Henson v. City of Dundee 6 to analyze the components of a hostile work en-
vironment. Accordingly, the five prong test announced in Henson embodies
the most common elements in hostile work environment causes of action.
The Henson court stated that in order to prevail the plaintiff must allege and
prove five elements to establish liability:7
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) The harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment."
8. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59.
9. M at 60.
10. I
11. Id. at 61.
12. Id at 61-62.
13. Id at 62.
14. Id. at 64; See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (1985).
15. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
16. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
17. Id at 903-05.
18. Following Meritor, the harassment must be "sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."
Meitor, 477 U.S. at 60.
1997]
5
Wiener and Hurt: Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When it is Har
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
(5) Respondeat superior 9
Since Meritor, the test of a hostile work environment claim has been
well established." In order to establish a primafacie case a woman worker
must show that because of her sex she was subjected to unwelcome social-
sexual conduct and that the conduct was "sufficiently severe or 'pervasive
to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment...' 2 In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that "the gravamen of
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.' ... The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.... ."2 The
Meritor court drew a distinction between consensual sex and welcomed
sexual relations. A woman who engages in consensual sexual relations with
a supervisor or coworker may succumb to the pressure of unwelcome invi-
tations for reasons of coercion rather than reasons of her own choosing. The
Court implied in its language that the plaintiff must prove that she acted in a
way that made it clear to the man who initiated social sexual contact that
this behavior was unwelcome.Y The Court went on to announce that testi-
mony about a complainant's provocative speech or dress could be consid-
ered as part of the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether or
not the plaintiff welcomed social sexual conduct at work.24
In its policy guidelines,' the EEOC adopted the following definition of
unwelcome from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Henson: the conduct is
unwelcome "... in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it,
19. The existence of respondeat superior and employer liability is a complicated finding
in its own right. The Cqurt rejected the EEOC's position that employers are always auto-
matically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors and the petitioner's view that the
mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against sexual harassment coupled with
the respondent's failure to use the procedure protects the employer from Title VII liability.
Instead the Court merely directed district courts to look to EEOC agency principles to deter-
mine liability. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
20. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 897; Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1986); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla 1991); Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1196
(1989).
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. While Title VII allows for sexual harassment complaints in
which women complain about the conduct of men at work and men complain about the con-
duct of women, it is much more common for the former to occur than the latter. See
BARBARA A. GUrEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPAcT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND
HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 49 (1985). This essay considers only
those situations in which women complain about the conduct of their male coworkers or male
supervisors.
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
23. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Har-
assinent Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 510 (1994).
24. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
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and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive."' 6 According to one commentator, the courts require women to
reject all social sexual conduct advanced toward them in a clear and unmis-
takable manner. In all instances, if a woman tells a man that the conduct is
unwelcome she has fulfilled this obligation. Consistently failing to respond
to suggestive behavior is enough in some instances. However, if a woman
shows some sign of inconsistent reaction in the presence of such conduct,
she may be signaling that the actions are indeed welcome. ' The EEOC
states in its policy guidelines that a woman can best demonstrate that the
conduct in question was unwelcome by making a complaint at the time that
the conduct occurs.29
While most legal commentators see value in the unwelcomeness re-
quirement because it protects consensual social sexual conduct in the work-
place," some feminist authors suggest that the courts should assume that so-
cial sexual conduct is unwelcome and place on the alleged harasser the
burden to prove that the woman welcomed the conduct. 31 More radical re-
formers would do away with the unwelcomeness test entirely because it fo-
cuses the inquiry on the victim and not upon the alleged harasser?2 Indeed
some courts have looked to the plaintiff's past behavior to determine
whether or not a woman welcomed advances by men at work. For example,
in Kresko v. Rulli, a Minnesota Court of Appeals held that it was relevant to
look to the fact that an intern and a supervisor frequently ate lunch together
and talked about their personal lives.3 Another court concluded that a wait-
ress welcomed sexual advances from her coworker because she visited him
in the hospital, drove with him, and welcomed his visits at her home.'
Moreover, another court held that a trainee welcomed the advances of her
IRS supervisor because she had kissed him on the cheek; this act was cap-
tured in a filmed snapshot.35 There are even some cases in which courts
have allowed evidence about a plaintiffs private sex life to determine
whether or not she welcomed the social sexual conduct of the alleged har-
26. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
27. See Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its
History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 628-33 (1997).
28. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
29. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. 915-50
(1990), EEOC Notice No. 915-050.
30. Weiner, supra note 27, at 634.
31. See B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73
B.U. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (1993); Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome"
Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1562 (1992); Miranda
Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1995); Radford, supra
note 23.
32. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 826-34 (1991).
33. Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
34. See Sardigal v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497
(S.D. Ill. 1986).
35. See Grubka v. Department of the Treasury, 858 F.2d 1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
19971
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asser. For example, in Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, the court considered
the fact that the plaintiff had been fired from a former job because she had
asked a married company foreman for a date. 6
In part to alleviate these concerns, in 1994 Congress amended Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 to extend the rape shield laws to civil cases so that
evidence offered to prove the plaintiff's sexual predisposition is inadmissi-
ble unless "its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party." 7 It is clear that the new
rule allows the trial judge a great deal of discretion in determining what evi-
dence to allow and what not to allow. Nonetheless, in at least one case,
Burger v. Litton Industries, Inc., the court ruled that a witness did not have
to reveal whether she had sexual relations with employees other than the ac-
cused harasser. "
The unwelcomeness rule and accompanying tests should be considered
in the context of the current procedure by which sexual harassment com-
plaints are litigated. The plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC, and
the EEOC must investigate the charges and seek voluntary compliance from
the employer. In the event that the employer refuses to comply with Title
VII and cooperate with the EEOC, the EEOC or the complainant may bring
suit against the employer.39 If the employer is sued, then the plaintiff must
prove the charges in a neutral forum (i.e., the courtroom) where the em-
ployer enjoys all the usual procedural due process protections provided in
federal law." The simplest and easiest way for the employer to comply with
the law and protect itself against litigation is to act quickly against alleged
harassers by either dismissing them or punishing them in some other man-
ner. Although Title VII guarantees the presentation of the charges and a
hearing to the employer, it does not address the rights of the alleged harasser
in any similar manner. In many cases it is the employer's discretion to de-
termine whether or not to conduct a full investigation of the charges or pro-
vide a neutral forum for disposition of the charges before acting against the
accused harasser."1
Most government workers are protected from being fired without cause
through the Federal Civil Rights Act of 197842 or similar state statutes. 43
Workers in the private sector often negotiate "just cause" standards for dis-
36. Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
37. FED. R. EVID. 412.
38. Burger v. Litton Industries, Inc., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 737 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b-f) (1997).
40. See Hannah K. Vorwerk, Note, The Forgotten Interest Group: Reforming Title VII to
Address the Concerns of Workers While Eliminating Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1019 (1995).
41. See id. at 1020.
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7521, §§ 7701-7703 (1988 & Supp. 1989-1990).
43. See 2 HENRY H. PERIrrr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACiCE § 6.5 at 10-
13 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 34
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charge in collective bargaining union contracts so that those who are hired
under such agreements have some due process protection if they are charged
with harassment." However, the due process protections of alleged harass-
ers are not addressed under Title VII even though accusations of violations
of Title VII may result in worker dismissal. Therefore, workers in "at will"
positions without "just cause" contracts can be dismissed from their posi-
tions without any reason (good or bad) provided.' In short, a private em-
ployer may opt to protect itself by firing a worker who has been accused of
harassment without an investigation unless the employee is protected by a
"just cause" contract. If the law eliminates the unwelcomeness prong of the
hostile worker harassment test or places the burden of proof on the em-
ployer, then employers of "at will" workers will be able to fire any worker
who has been accused of sexual harassment. Moreover, the employer will
not be constrained by the law's requirement that the complainant did not
welcome the social sexual conduct in question.
It is clear from our brief analysis that the issues that support and oppose
the unwelcomeness test are subtle and complicated. We argue that one
piece of information that is missing in the debate is the status of welcome-
ness determinations in the decision processes of workers. If workers
(female or male) make everyday judgments of harassment by looking to the
welcomeness status of social sexual conduct at work, then there is good rea-
son for the law to include this test in some form. If the issue of welcome-
ness is not used by workers then its pivotal status is of less certain value.
This is especially true because a welcomeness analysis is likely to focus on
the conduct of the complainant. Further, if there are differences in the use
of welcomeness by men and women workers in their assessments of har-
assment, then retaining the welcomeness test in its current form provides
some protection against unfounded dismissal of men in "at will" positions
who are without procedural protections. If companies learn that women
need not demonstrate the unwelcomeness of the alleged harasser's conduct,
then the employer is best served by discharging men accused of any social
sexual conduct regardless of whether the action was invited or not. For
these reasons, the question of whether men and women use the welcome-
ness standard to evaluate social sexual conduct at work is an empirical
question of major importance. In addition, the relative weighing of the wel-
comeness criteria by men and women is also an interesting psychological
issue in its own right.
Determining when sexual misconduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to reach the Meritor threshold is a difficult decision upon which turn the
outcomes of many grievances. Most courts and the EEOC agree that iso-
lated instances of misconduct do not satisfy the test. 4 Instead, patterns of
44. See Vorwerk, supra note 40, at 1032.
45. Id. at 1032.
46. See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications
of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV.
1997]
9
Wiener and Hurt: Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When it is Har
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
frequently occurring behaviors that are judged to be offensive must be dem-
onstrated unless a particularly severe incident of sexual misconduct such as
unwelcome, intentional touching of intimate body parts has occurred. In
general, the frequency of unwelcome sexual conduct needed to satisfy the
"severe or pervasive" rule is negatively related to the severity of the har-
assment. 7 The Supreme Court reiterated this logic in its recent holding in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc."8
The president of Forklift Systems, an equipment rental company, told a
female manager on several occasions, "You're a woman, what do you
know" and 'We need a man as the rental manager. '49 President Hardy
called manager Harris a "dumb ass woman."5  Evidence at trial revealed
that Hardy had asked Harris and other female employees to retrieve coins
from his front pants pockets, and had thrown objects on the ground in front
of the women and asked them to pick up the objects." Hardy had made sex-
ual innuendoes about Harris and other women's clothing.' Hardy com-
mented to Harris after she had closed a deal, "What did you do, promise the
guy.., some [sex] Saturday night?"'53 The district court found that although
some of Hardy's comments would be offensive to a reasonable woman they
were not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psycho-
logical well-being," and therefore did not reach the level of harassment.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings. However, the Su-
preme Court reversed the decision.' Justice O'Connor writing a unanimous
opinion for the court, stated "[s]o long as the environment would reasonably
be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it
to also be psychologically injurious."' 6 Justice O'Connor defined a hostile
or abusive work environment as one that "a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive."' She also stated that there is no Title VII violation "....
[i]f the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abu-
sive .... ,,' In other words, the test for a hostile work environment includes
both an objective prong,-sufficient severity or pervasiveness from the per-
spective of a reasonable person-and a subjective prong-abusiveness from
the perspective of the complainant.
773, 793 (1993).
47. See generally EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR §
1604.11(b) (1997).
48. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).





54. Id at 20.
55. Id
56. Id at 22 (emphasis added).
57. Id at 21.
58. Id at 22.
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From a legal point of view the subjective prong denies the legitimacy of
complaints made about work environments by workers who observe social
sexual conduct among others but who are not subjectively offended by the
conduct. For example, a coworker would have to show that a relationship
between two other employees was offensive to her or himself before making
a successful primafacie case of hostile work environment harassment. It is
not enough that such behavior may be offensive to a reasonable person (i.e.,
the would be complainant) if it is not offensive to the target of the conduct.
Further, workers who complain about social sexual behavior targeted at
themselves must show that they not only found the behavior unwelcome but
also subjectively offensive.
From a psychological perspective this analysis makes the subjective de-
cision process of female and male workers not only theoretically interesting
but also pragmatically important. In Part III below, we present some pre-
liminary data that provide such an analysis of this subjective process. We
are convinced that the courts and legislatures could only benefit from a psy-
chological analysis that describes and explains how women and men reach
these subjective judgments about social sexual conduct at work.
It is perhaps less obvious how employers would benefit from such an
analysis. However, we believe that the best way to educate employees
about the risks of offensive conduct is to replace a list of "do's and don'ts"
with an empirically based description of the similarities and differences in
the processes that women and men use to evaluate social sexual conduct at
work. From such a list it should be possible to distill principles that predict
what kinds of conduct will be offensive and what kinds will be seen as not
offensive in different workplace contexts and circumstances. For example,
there is little to be gained by telling male workers not to tell offensive jokes,
but there is much to be gained by uncovering and explaining the factors that
women look to when they evaluate the offensiveness of jokes told in work-
place contexts. We believe it is these principles that must ultimately be-
come part of the workplace subculture if men and women are ever going to
eliminate abusive sexual conduct from the workplace.
In applying the sufficiently "severe or pervasive" test the courts have
attempted three different approaches with varying amounts of success.
First, following the lead of the Sixth Circuit, 9 the Supreme Court adopted
".... the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environ-
ment under essentially like or similar circumstances."6 Thus, the law gener-
ally asks whether the unwelcome social-sexual behavior was so pervasive or
severe as to create a hostile or abusive working environment from the view
point of the objective, reasonable person." Although the law considers this
approach to be an "objective" one (i.e., the law adopts a point of view that
59. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
60. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
61. See EEOC Policy Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1997).
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does not take into consideration the idiosyncratic sensitivities of the com-
plainant), it falls far short of operationalizing the construct of sexual har-
assment with the specificity commonly found in social science research.
The legal definition of sexual harassment does not and can not enumerate
which specific behaviors or patterns of behaviors, independent of context,
rise to the level of harassment.
Summarizing the case law, the EEOC outlined a number of factors that
triers of fact should look to in determining whether the conduct complained
of was so objectively offensive that it crossed the line of actionable con-
duct."' These include: "(1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical or
both; (2) how frequently the conduct was repeated; (3) whether the conduct
was hostile or patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a
coworker or a supervisor; (5) whether others joined in perpetrating the har-
assment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one in-dividual. '
We argue here and elsewhere' that these factors constitute a normative
judgment model comprised of a set of decision points that individuals ought
to traverse when reaching a harassment decision. These factors along with
examples in the case law are helpful in that they direct decision makers to
the types of contextual information that they should look to in order to reach
the objective decisions required by law. However, they fail to inform the
decision maker how to weigh specific types of conduct to reach final judg-
ments. They also do not explain how to adjust the weights according to the
contextual factors (e.g., intentions of the workers, status of the workers, lo-
cation of the conduct, or reactions of the woman) that engulf episodes of so-
cial sexual conduct at work.
Psycholegal researchers have exerted a great deal of effort to try to un-
derstand the impact of specific factors in the perception of harassment." As
helpful as these efforts have been, they do not provide practical advice be-
cause it is not possible to present a complete list of social sexual behaviors
and surrounding contexts for workers to evaluate. For such a list to be ex-
62. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice
No. 915-050 (1990).
63. Id.
64. See Richard L. Wiener et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: The Effects of Gen-
der, Legal Standard, and Ambivalent Sexism, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1997) [hereinafter
Sexual Harassment]; Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence in Sexual Harass-
ment Litigation: The Role of Social Framework and Social Fact, 51 J. Soc. IssuEs 167
(1995) [hereinafter Social Framework]; Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investiga-
tion of Hostile Work Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 LAW &
Hum. BEHAV. 263 (1995) [hereinafter Reasonable Woman].
65. For reviews of this research literature, see Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment:
Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 1070 (1993); Patricia A. Fra-
zier et al, Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc.
ISSUES 21 (1995); Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Rea-
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haustive, it would need to include a very large number of actions, contexts,
and combinations of actions and contexts. Therefore, we have abandoned
the more traditional psychometric approach in which researchers have tried
to catalogue and measure the influence of specific factors in the perception
of social sexual conduct in favor of an approach in which we try to map out
the decision process that men and women naturally employ when they think
about social sexual conduct at work.
Like the EEOC, we are interested in the types of factors that men and
women use to reach harassment judgments. However, we examined these
factors by asking workers to evaluate their own examples of social sexual
conduct rather than looking to case law. From their answers we constructed
decision trees that display the thinking and logic that went into these sub-
jective judgments. One of the goals of our work is to compare the empirical
decision structures that we find to the normative structures that make up the
law. We believe that the differences in the two represent the misfit between
the law and the manner in which men and women interact in the workplace.
In dealing with the ambiguity inherent in the law, one jurisdiction un-
successfully tried to narrow the range of behaviors that constitute sexual
harassment by adopting the view that offensive conduct must cause some
"psychological harm" for it to reach the level of abuse prohibited by Title
VII." In Harris, the Supreme Court ruled that such a narrow definition of
harassment was not an accurate reading of Meritor. Clarifying the Supreme
Court's position, Justice O'Connor wrote, "there is no need for [offensive
conduct] ... to be psychologically injurious. '  Although lower courts may
still consider whether sexual misconduct affects the psychological well-
being of the plaintiff, they must look to the totality of the circumstances
rather than to any single factor such as psychological injury to determine
what constitutes a hostile work environment."
Other courts have more successfully fashioned a "wider" definition of
harassment by adopting the "reasonable victim or woman" test. In 1990, the
EEOC endorsed a more liberal definition of harassment following legal
commentators who argued that work is a distinctively different experience
for women than it is for men. Women are relative newcomers to the work
place and view their jobs as marginal or precarious, they hold a more re-
strictive view of appropriate sexual encounters at work, and they are less
likely than men to believe that social-sexual encounters at work are mutu-
ally desired.' Recognizing the significance of the divergence of views be-
66. SeeRabiduev. Osceola Refining, Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth
Circuit held that only unwelcomed social sexual misconduct "that affected seriously the psy-
chological well-being of the plaintiff' reached the level necessary to create a hostile work
environment. See also Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Vance v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989).
67. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
68. See il at 22.
69. See Abrams, supra note 20.
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tween women and men, the Ninth Circuit switched from the gender neutral
reasonable person approach and adopted a reasonable woman standard, rul-
ing "that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment
when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment."7 Other jurisdictions including the Third
Circuit,7' the Sixth Circuit,72 and at least two district courts73 have also
adopted the reasonable woman standard.
Although there are some exceptions, the empirical research supports the
view that men and women workers hold divergent perspectives concerning
what constitutes hostile work environment harassment.7' Few researchers
70. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990).
72. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
73. See Austen v. State of Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612 (D. Haw. 1991); Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
74. See Louise F. Fitzgerald & Alayne J. Ormerod, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment:
The Influence of Gender and Academic Context, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.,281 (1991); Ricki
Garlick, Male and Female Responses to Ambiguous Instructor Behaviors, 30 SEX ROLES 135
(1994); Amy H. Gervasio & Katy Ruckdeschel, College Students' Judgments of Verbal Sex-
ual Harassment, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 190 (1992); Barbara A. Gutek et al., Predict-
ing Social-Sexual Behavior at Work: A Contact Hypothesis, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 560 (1990);
Masoud G. Hemmasi & Gail S. Russ, Gender-Related Jokes in the Workplace: Sexual Humor
or Sexual?, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1114 (1994); Catherine B. Johnson et al., Persis-
tence of Men's Misperceptions of Friendly Cues Across a Variety of Interpersonal Encoun-
ters, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 463 (1991); Tricia S. Jones & Martin S. Renmland, Sources of
Variability in Perceptions of and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 27 SEx ROLES 121
(1992); Sylvia Kenig & John Ryan, Sex Differences in Levels of Tolerance and Attribution of
Blame for Sexual Harassment on a University Campus, 15 SEX ROLES 535 (1986); Michelle
A. Marks & Eileen S. Nelson, Sexual Harassment on Campus: Effects of Professor Gender
on Perception of Sexually Harassing Behavior, 28 SEx ROLES 207 (1993); Donald B. Mazer
& Elizabeth F. Percival, Ideology or Experience? The Relationships Among Perceptions, At-
titudes, and Experiences of Sexual Harassment in University Students. 20 SEx ROLES 135
(1989); Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment of University Faculty by Colleagues and
Students, 23 Sx ROLES 421 (1990); Kathleen McKinney, Contrapower Sexual Harassment:
The Effects of Student Sex and Type of Behavior on Faculty Perceptions, 27 SEX ROLES 627
(1992); Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment and College Faculty Members, 15 DEVIANT
BEHAv. 171 (1994); Audrey J. Murrell & Beth L. Dietz-Uhler, Gender Identity and Adver-
sarial Sexual Beliefs as Predictors of Attitudes Toward Sexual Harassment, 17 PSYCHOL.
WOMAN Q. 169 (1993); Steven C. Padgitt & Janet S. Padgitt, Cognitive Structure of Sexual
Harassment: Implications for University Policy, 27 J. C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 34 (1986);
Paula M. Popovich et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment as a Function of Sex of Rater
and Incident Form and Consequence, 27 SEx ROLES 609 (1992); Gary N. Powell, Effects of
Sex Role Identity and Sex on Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 14 SEx ROLEs 9 (1986); John
B. Pryor, The Lay Person's Understanding of Sexual Harassment, 13 SEx ROLES 273 (1985);
Linda J. Rubin & Sherry B. Borgers, Sexual Harassment in Universities During the 1980s, 23
SEX ROLES 397 (1990); Russel J. Summers, Determinants of Judgments of and Responses to a
Complaint of Sexual Harassment, 25 SEx ROLES 379 (1991); Suzanne Valentine-French & H.
Lorraine Radtke, Attributions of Responsibility for an Incident of Sexual Harassment in a
University Setting, 21 SEX ROLES 545 (1989); Karen B. Williams & Ramona R. Cyr, Esca-
lating Commitment to a Relationship: The Sexual Harassment Trap, 27 SEx ROLES 47
(1992). For a review of gender effects in the perception of sexual harassment, see Wiener et
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fail to find gender differences in studying the decisions of men and
women,7' however some argue the size of the difference is small and that
men and women view most harassing conduct from a similar point of view.7"
We have argued elsewhere that those who fail to find meaningful gender
differences often present either very mild examples of social sexual mis-
conduct or very severe examples.77 Indeed some of the studies that find
small gender differences present fact patterns that would likely result in
quid pro quo harassment complaints in addition to, or instead of, hostile
work environment causes of action. We argue that when applying the law's
objective standard, men and women use their own personal perspectives as
the reference point for reasonable conduct. Because gender is central to
one's definition of self, gender effects on reasonableness are almost un-
avoidable except under conditions of extremely mild or severe conduct.
Under the former conditions the evaluator may find it difficult to imagine
herself or himself offended enough to lodge a complaint, and under the lat-
ter conditions she or he may find it difficult to imagine herself or himself
the object of such hostile activity. In these cases, the evaluator may apply
the rule, "any conduct so benign as to inhibit an image of a formal com-
plaint does not reach the level of harassment and any conduct so severe that
it inhibits the image of oneself as a victim automatically reaches the level of
harassment."'7 We carefully examined gender differences in the decision
trees we constructed from the open ended interviews that we report below.
The gender debate withstanding, we have conducted two empirical
studies in which we asked respondents to read fact patterns from two im-
portant sexual harassment cases, Ellison v. Brady and Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co. In addition, we supplied them with either the reasonable per-
son or reasonable woman standard to use when evaluating the conduct." In
the first study we found differences in the process that evaluators used to
reach harassment judgments, but no differences in their final decisions as a
result of type of legal standard. However, in the second study, in which we
included a measure of hostile and benevolent sexism, we found that under
al., Sexual Harassment, supra note 64; Wiener et al., Reasonable Woman, supra note 64;
Fitzgerald, supra note 65.
75. For important examples of studies that have failed to find gender differences or have
found weak ones, see Douglas D. Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: A Re-
Examination of Gender Differences, 124 J. PSYCHOL. 409 (1990); Wilbur A. Castellow et al.,
Effects of Physical Attractiveness of the Plaintiff and Defendant in Sexual Harassment Judg-
ments, 5 J. Soc. BEHAv. & PERSONALITY (1990); J. Michael Egbert et al., The Effect of Liti-
gant Social Desirability on Judgments Regarding a Sexual Harassment Case, 7 J. Soc.
BEHAv. & PERSONALTY 569 (1992); Pryor, supra note 74; Daniel A. Thomann & Richard L.
Wiener, Physical and Psychological Causality as Determinants of Culpability in Sexual Har-
assment Cases, 17 SEx ROLES 573 (1987).
76. See Frazier et al., supra note 65; Gutek & O'Connor, supra note 65.
77. See Wiener et al., Sexual Harassment, supra note 64.
78. Id. at 88-89.
79. See Wiener et al., Reasonable Woman, supra note 64; Wiener et al., Sexual Harass-
ment, supra note 64.
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some conditions the reasonable woman standard, as compared to the reason-
able person standard, resulted in some respondents finding more evidence of
harassment. For example, men low in hostile sexism were more likely to
conclude that the actions in both cases constituted hostile work environment
harassment when they applied the reasonable woman standard as opposed to
the reasonable person standard. In a third study in which we presented
video taped reenactments that show affirmative action officers interviewing
complainants, the accused, and witnesses in the above cases, we found
stronger evidence that the reasonable woman standard is more likely to re-
sult in judgments of harassment. Finally, across all three studies, we found
strong gender effects such that women were more likely to reach harassment
judgments than men.8"
One commentator rejects entirely the logic and confusion that she be-
lieves is inherent in the debate between the reasonable person and reason-
able woman standards.81 She maintains that the current law requires a
"normative" judgment in each case to determine whether the harassing con-
duct is offensive enough to constitute an abusive environment. Regardless
of the perspective taken (i.e., either the gender neutral reasonable person or
the point of view of the victim), the law currently requires a judgment of
how much "women should put up with at work."82
Rejecting the idea that women should put up with any discrimination at
work, Professor Hadfield argues that gender discrimination under Title VII
need not be based on unwelcome sexual conduct at all. Instead, she argues
that the law should replace sexual harassment principles with the view that
sex based discrimination is a cost of employment for women at work and
that the cost will cause women to make decisions that are different from
those that men make in similar work environments." The fact that sex-
based harassment offers economic costs to women and not to men is enough
to find an actionable Title VII claim regardless of whether or not the con-
duct was sufficiently offensive from either a subjective or objective stan-
dard. Professor Hadfield argues that among the more serious costs of so-
cial-sexual conduct at work are constraints on the career choices of women
who would avoid such conduct; limitations in career advancement as a re-
sult of reduction in the woman worker's flexibility, productivity, and ambi-
tion; and high rates of female turnover and lower levels of workplace at-
tachment. It is the anticipation of sex based harassment that is the heavy
operative in shaping the economic choices that women make with regard to
job choices.
80. See Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Gender Differences in the Evaluation of
Social Sexual Conduct at Work (May 1997) (unpublished paper presented to the Annual
Convention of the American Psychological Society).
81. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83
CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1995).
82. Id. at 1167.
83. See id. at 1169.
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As rational actors, women choose to avoid sex based harassment in
their careers, all other things being equal." In other words, a woman on the
margin, one who is "indifferent between the job she is doing and switching
to her next best alternative,""5 will weigh the costs and benefits of switching
jobs against those of not leaving her current position. If the cost of experi-
enced or expected sex-based harassment is great enough, it will cause the
rational woman to decide to stay in her current job or move to another to
avoid the costs.
Based upon her economic analysis Professor Hadfield would replace
the current standard for sexual harassment with the following "rational
woman" test: "Non-job-related sex-based conduct constitutes sex discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII if a rational woman's choice between two
jobs offering her substantially equivalent benefits would be influenced by
the fact that such conduct is present in one job but not the other. " 6 The test
is offered as a hypothetical, so that it is not necessary to determine whether
an individual woman found the behavior in question harassing, or even if a
reasonable woman would find the conduct offensive. It is enough to deter-
mine whether there are costs that women must weigh in their career decision
calculus that men do not need to consider. The only subjective component
of the test would be in those cases in which the defendant could show that a
particular plaintiff actually initiated the behavior that she later found offen-
sive.' Presumably in that narrow situation the plaintiff could not treat the
experience or anticipation of that social sexual conduct as a cost in her ca-
reer decisions.
Professor Hadfield's analysis is thoughtful and internally consistent.
However, like many economic analyses in law, it is based upon assumptions
about the decision processes of people that can be challenged with empirical
data. The career calculus of a rational woman includes specific assumptions
that may or may not stand up to empirical investigation. Namely, the eco-
nomic analysis she sets out suggests that sex based conduct is always con-
sidered a cost to women unless the woman initiates the conduct. It is not
obvious that a rational woman would necessarily make decisions in this
manner. It is possible, indeed likely, that for a substantial number of
women, social sexual conduct at work contains rewards as well as costs and
that the overall valence of the conduct depends upon the context and con-
siderations of the women involved. For example, the experience of an un-
married heterosexual woman being asked out on a date by a man at work
whom she finds interesting is not likely to have the same cost/benefit struc-
ture as the experience of a married woman being repeatedly pursued by a
man she dislikes and whom she has repeatedly told to discontinue the invi-
84. See id at 1177.
85. Id
86. Id at 1150-81 (emphasis added).
87. See id at 1183.
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tations. For the first woman, the net worth of the sex based conduct may
actually include more rewards than costs. The only way to avoid the nor-
mative analysis that Professor Hadfield protests is to assume that all social
sexual conduct at work is costly (i.e. offensive) to women.
We believe that the decision processes that women and men use to
analyze social sexual conduct at work should be empirically evaluated be-
fore concluding that social sexual conduct is normatively treated as a cost.
The research we report below is designed to map out the decision strategies
that "rational" men and women use to analyze social sexual conduct at
work. Of particular interest is the question of whether workers consistently
emphasize the costs and de-emphasize the rewards of social sexual conduct
at work. In this section we have raised several empirical questions that are
central to some of the liveliest debates in sexual harassment law. In the next
section, we lay out the philosophy of our approach to gathering information
that will help answer some of the questions that we have raised.
II. SOCIAL ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE
In a series of papers ' we have laid out a model of psycholegal analysis
that is the product of an interdisciplinary methodology. We have termed the
model "social analytic jurisprudence" because it combines empirical inves-
tigation of social and psychological reality with traditional legal analysis.
Our approach is to provide empirical knowledge to legislative function of
the courts and other law making bodies. Social analytic jurisprudence
makes three important assumptions about the role of psychology in law and
public policy.
First, psychology as it relates to law is an empirical science.89 There
exists a collection of psycholegal scientists who share a common commit-
ment to a set of scientific beliefs and values and who agree upon the par-
ticular problems and solutions that are relevant to issues of law. These be-
liefs constitute a scientific research paradigm90 and it is the product of the
work of these scientists that ought to influence judicial and legislative deci-
sion making.
Second, the psycholegal scholar can best contribute to the legal debate
by presenting the tested results of psychological research. The legitimacy
with which psychological knowledge can be applied to issues of law is di-
rectly related to the psychological facts that are tested and accumulated.
Legal psychologists ought to base their conclusions more on data and less
88. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social
Cognition Goes to Court, 37 ST. Louis U. L. J. 503 (1993) [hereinafter Social Analytical Ju-
risprudence]; Wiener, Social Framework, supra note 64; Wiener et al., Reasonable Woman,
supra note 64 ; Wiener et al., Sexual Harassment, supra note 64.
89. See Wiener, Social Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 88, at 510-15.
90. See ROY LACHMAN Er AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND INFORMATION PROCESSING
(1979); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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on the shared social and political ideologies that make up the scientific
paradigm. When psychologists rest their arguments on a value consensus
rather than a reliable data base, they risk the danger of forming a political
platform which is adhered to by only some members of the paradigm and
which is not driven by the growth of psychological knowledge.9'
Finally, the proper role of the scientific psychologist in policy debate
and conflict resolution is that of a consultant rather than an advocate.2 Ad-
vocates use the product of psychological knowledge to support one side of a
debate, the side that is consistent with the advocates' political or ideological
value positions. Advocates adopt confirming perspectives in which they
search psychological knowledge for research results that support a chosen
position. Of course, it would be naive to suggest that any psycholegal
scholars conduct value free research. It is unquestionable that value posi-
tions impact the choice of research questions, methods, data interpretations,
and final conclusions. However, a consultant adopts a disconfirming point
of view and searches research results for evidence that can refute all plausi-
ble rival explanations including and especially his or her own. It is in the
best interest of the research scientist to expose her or his own disconfirming
data because the peer review process will likely uncover this evidence if the
researcher fails to do so. The adversarial approach that is at the heart of our
legal system supplements the peer review process for psycholegal scholars
who communicate psychological knowledge in the form of expert testi-
mony.
Social analytic jurisprudence begins with an analysis of legal doctrine
carefully looking for assumptions that the law makes about human behav-
ior.' To be useful for adjudicative or legislative decision making, psy-
cholegal research must address questions of substantive law. The language
and concepts used in the investigation should track closely the language and
concepts that make up the law. The work of psychological researchers is
most useful in legal analysis if the investigators understand the law and pose
research questions in a way that bears directly on the legal issues that give
rise to the questions.
The second stage of social analytic jurisprudence consists of a careful
psychological analysis of the law." Statutory and common law are com-
prised of legal tests that are decided on the social facts presented in specific
cases. The tests are often framed in language that invites a social scientific
and perhaps a psychological investigation. Further, some judicial decisions
require a balancing test among conflicting legal principles about which so-
cial scientists can gather probative information. After identifying the em-
pirical issues in the law, the psycholegal scholar reviews the psychological
91. See Wiener, Social Analytical Jurisprudence, supra 88, at 511.
92. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHYSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1991).
93. See Wiener, Social Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 8.8, at 511-13.
94. See id at 512-13.
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literature to identify theories, research results, and methodologies that are
most suitable to answer the legal questions. It is at this stage in the analysis
that the investigation takes on a psychological flavor.
While it may be helpful to apply the powerful research methodologies
of the social sciences to test intuitive answers to empirical questions, that
process by itself falls short of realizing the interdisciplinary promise that
psychology makes to the interaction of law and social science. Psycholegal
scholarship is based on the discipline of psychology as much as it is
founded in the law. Therefore researchers should be comfortable with
turning to the substantive literature in psychology to find metaphors, theo-
ries, and hypotheses that offer tentative answers to legal questions or that
offer models of analysis that researchers can use to find answers. Psychole-
gal scholarship should take advantage of the sophisticated methodologies
available to social scientists but it should also take advantage of the knowl-
edge base of the social sciences. 5 Section I in this paper is an example of a
psycholegal analysis that follows the assumptions and methods of the first
two stages of our model. We have laid out the law with an eye for current
topics of debate, and we have identified several empirical questions that
bear directly on those topics. Finally, we have adopted the hierarchical de-
cision model metaphor from social cognitive psychology to describe the de-
cision processes of men and woman as they evaluate social sexual conduct
at work.
The third stage of social analytic jurisprudence follows directly from
the first two. It is likely that a psycholegal analysis of the knowledge base
related to any area of law will point out wide gaps of understanding. There
may be a dearth of information on topics that speak directly to the legal is-
sues at debate or more likely there will be relevant studies that researchers
conducted without benefit of a thorough legal analysis, so that the results
may not be directly relevant to the substantive legal issues." In the third
stage of social analytic jurisprudence, psycholegal scholars conduct research
that tests the psychological theories and models they applied to answer the
empirical issues identified in stages 1 and 2. It is at this point that the pow-
erful methodological and statistical tools of the behavioral scientist may be
used to gather data that speak directly to the legal issues at debate.7
There are three ways in which social science can be brought to bear
upon the law of sexual harassment or any other legal doctrine: it can assume
an adjustment or assessment role, an implementation role, or an evaluative
role. Law presents normative theories of behavior as depicted in the lan-
guage of statutes, court opinions, and administrative rules and regulations.
Psychological research can and does study the actual conduct of people to
measure the fit between the law's normative model and actual behavior.
95. See iU. at 511-13.
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The goal of social science acting in this capacity is to offer suggestions of
how the normative model might be adjusted to better fit social reality. Per-
haps the best known examples of psychology acting in this capacity are the
study of eyewitness memory9" and lineups." The study of procedural justice
provides a less well known but equally valid example of psychology at-
tempting to adjust the normative model inherent in the law.' The data pre-
sented in Part III of this manuscript are an example of psychology serving
the adjustment role in sexual harassment law.
Second, psychology can and does assist with the implementation of cur-
rent law. It is perhaps in this role that research psychology has had its most
direct impact. Examples include the study of police discretion, 1' jury deci-
sion making,"~ judicial decision making,"° parole decision making," and
sentencing." It is not a coincidence that each of these areas focuses on the
decision making and/or judgment capability of significant actors in the legal
process because the implementation of law is closely tied to making deci-
sions under the constraint of substantive and procedural rules. Acting in its
implementation role, psychology measures against statutory, administrative,
and judicial principles the effectiveness of the people who execute the law.
The purpose of this research is not only to improve the quality of legal proc-
ess but also to apply our knowledge of social and cognitive behavior to un-
derstand how people function as lawyers, jurors, judges, administrators,
legislators, and so on. With regard to sexual harassment law, psychological
investigation of jury decision making in hostile work environment cases
would be particularly fruitful following the 1991 revision of Title VII which
makes jury trials available at the request of plaintiffs and defendants." 6
98. See BRIAN L. CUrLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTICATION: THE
EYEwrrNEss, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995).
99. See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Re-
search and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 765 (1995).
100. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Processes and Legal Institutions, in
1 SOCIAL JUsTIcE IN HuMAN RELATIONS 71 (Riel Vermunt & Herman Steensma eds., 1991).
101. See Michael T. Nietzel & Cynthia M. Hartung, Psychological Research on the
Police: An Introduction to a Special Section on the Psychology of Law Enforcement, 17 L. &
HUM. BEHAv. 151 (1993).
102. See INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid Hastie
ed., 1993).
103. See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Understanding Judges' Sentencing Decisions: Attribu-
tions of Responsibility and Story Construction, in 3 APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES
TO SOCIAL ISSUES: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL ISSUES 91 (Linda Heath
et al. eds., 1994).
104. See John S. Carroll & Pamela A. Burke, Evaluation and Prediction in Expert Pa-
role Decisions, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEaHv. 315 (1990).
105. See Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455 (1995); Richard L. Wiener et al., The
Role of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge in Capital Murder Sentencing, J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 1998).
106. The National Science Foundation has awarded a grant to Barbara Gutek at the Uni-
versity of Arizona to examine this issue.
19971
21
Wiener and Hurt: Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When it is Har
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
CALTFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Finally, in its evaluative function social science measures the impact of
the law on the everyday lives of citizens. Psychological research can either
directly test the effects of legislation or judicial holdings on the behavior of
those citizens targeted by the law or it can examine how different formula-
tions of law influence the social and cognitive behavior of those citizens.
Two well known examples are studies of the influence of the breathalyser
crackdown in Great Britain' and the effects of custody laws on children.' °8
With regard to sexual harassment, the studies we conducted and described
above '0 examine the differences in the "reasonable person" and "reasonable
woman" standards on the perception of social sexual conduct in the work
place." We argue that the evaluative function is at least as important as the
implementation function because the manner in which legal decisions are
made affects fewer citizens than does the substance of the decisions. In
other words, the most important impact of the reasonable person vs. reason-
able woman standard lies not in how the actual language influences the
resolution of conflicts at trial, but rather in the manner in which the promul-
gated rules influence the behavior of men and women in the workplace. As
we have argued elsewhere, the pragmatic difference in these two standards
is to be found in the impact of the standards on the perceptions of men and
women in the workplace.
For the purposes of the present article, we are concerned more with the
adjustment or assessment function of social science. It is undeniable that
one purpose of sexual harassment law is to regulate social sexual conduct in
the workplace. The rules of conduct that the law promulgates originate
from a normative model of how workers interact at work. The normative
expectations are laid out in the language of the rules. For example, it is
clear from the current standards in sexual harassment doctrine that the law
expects workers (especially women) to be offended by uninvited social sex-
ual attention in the workplace. Moreover, if the attention is severe and per-
vasive, it will cause enough discomfort to interfere with the work perform-
ance and satisfaction of workers. Social science, especially psychology, is
well suited to study the manner in which people actually do behave. There-
fore social science can take on an adjustment role in which research uncov-
ers the mechanisms that govern behavior in the target domain and tests the
adequacy of the fit between the normative model implied in the law and the
107. See Hugh L. Ross et al., Determining The Social Effects of a Legal Reform: The
British "Breathalyser" Crackdown of 1967, 13 AMER. BEHAv. SCIENTIST 493 (1970).
108. See Patricia J. Falk, The Gap Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical
Research in Lesbian-mother Child Custody Cases, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 131 (Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds.,
1994).
109. See Wiener et al., Reasonable Woman, supra note 64; Wiener et al., Sexual Har-
assment, supra note 64.
110. The National Science Foundation has awarded a grant to the first author of this pa-
per to continue this work.
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social reality of human interaction."' Psychologists can and should point
out the discrepancies between how people actually behave and the way in
which the law assumes that they behave. At times research may demon-
strate that the central proposition in the law's normative model is in error.
At other times research may show that the model is somewhat or mostly
correct but that certain adjustments are needed to correct flaws in the law's
implicit theory. Such adjustments may influence future changes in the law
by informing legislatures and courts.
The normative model of Title VII hostile work environment harassment
law assumes that workers rely on assessments of unwelcomeness when de-
termining whether social sexual conduct is harassing. It assumes that the
severity and pervasiveness of social sexual misconduct is related to whether
the conduct was verbal or physical, its frequency of occurrence, the power
differential between the workers, whether the conduct was offensive,
whether others were involved, and toward whom the conduct was directed.
In Part III we report on some initial qualitative and quantitative data
that describe the process by which people reach rational judgments con-
cerning social sexual conduct at work. We are particularly interested in any
gaps between the manner in which our respondents make these judgments
and the manner in which the law expects that they do. We believe exploring
these discrepancies will help direct the legal and policy debates of the future
regarding the role of unwelcomeness in harassment law and the type of se-
verity and pervasiveness standard (objective and subjective) that will best fit
the actual conduct of men and women in the workplace.
III. SOCIAL ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION
The research team conducted in-depth interviews with 25 men and 25
women full-time employees residing in the St. Louis metropolitan area.
Participants were recruited through advertisements placed in local newspa-
pers. We used the 1995 St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Asso-
ciation's Demographics of the St. Louis Metro Area to collect a stratified
random sample based on age and race. Qualified respondents were sched-
uled for 90 minute open-ended interviews on the Saint Louis University
campus and were reimbursed $25 for their time. The average age of the 50
participants was 39 years and six months. Eighty percent of this sample
were Caucasian, 16% were African-American, 2% were Asian, and 2%
111. Many legal commentaries try to test the fit between the normative models in the
law and the author's intuitive or principled theory of human behavior. See, e.g., Hadfield,
supra note 81. Professor Hadfield's introduction of the "rational woman" test in harassment
law challenges the notion that only uninvited and offensive social sexual conduct impacts
negatively the work experience of women. The rational woman theory proposes that any so-
cial sexual conduct in the work place is a cost to women and will impact work place behavior
in a negative manner. Therefore, the rational woman test would prohibit any sex-based ac-
tivity that a hypothetical rational woman could consider a cost.
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were Hispanic. Twenty-eight percent of the women in this sample claimed
they had been victims of sexual harassment in the workplace, and 6% of the
men in this sample admitted they had been accused of sexual harassment at
some time.
The 50 participants answered each of the following questions: (1) De-
scribe those work place behaviors that men direct toward women which are
sexual in nature and which you firmly believe are examples of sexual har-
assment; (2) Describe those work place behaviors that men direct toward
women which are sexual in nature but which you firmly believe are not seri-
ous enough to reach the level of sexual harassment; and (3) Describe those
work place behaviors that men direct toward women which are sexual in
nature but which you believe are ambiguous with regard to whether or not
they reach the level of sexual harassment. Respondents were not given a
definition of sexual harassment, but instead were told to use their own. We
did not want to bias or restrict our interviewees' cognitive representations of
sexual harassment by imposing a defining structure on their answers. Our
goal in interviewing these full-time workers was to explore their subjective
experiences of social sexual conduct in the workplace and describe the
manner in which they determined whether the behaviors were harassing,
non-harassing, or ambiguous. The interviewers probed the respondents'
initial answers and asked the participants to clarify and support their re-
sponses with the circumstances surrounding the behaviors and the reasons
why they considered each of the behaviors they mentioned to be harassing,
non-harassing, or ambiguous.
We used structured, open-ended questions with specific probes in our
interviews in order to elicit as much information from each respondent as
possible. We chose not to limit interview responses by asking close-ended
or fixed-choice response questions. Research has shown that close-ended
questions give directions to respondents both for response format and re-
sponse content. "2 We did not want to direct our interviewees' responses.
Instead our intention was to collect rich, descriptive responses to our que-
ries. The interviewers carefully recorded the answers to each of the ques-
tions, preserving the original language of the respondents. Female inter-
viewers interviewed female respondents, and male interviewers interviewed
male respondents. After answering the interview questions, each respondent
completed a written survey sheet asking for demographic information and
any previous experience they may have had with sexual harassment. Upon
112. See HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN AT-
TIUDE SURvEYs (1981). These researchers reported a series of comparisons between open-
ended and close-ended questions in surveys using national probability samples of adults. Re-
sults showed that close-ended questions produced a more uniform response pattern than did
open-ended questions, and close-ended questions determined the content of the respondents'
answers. Open-ended questions allowed the response format to vary more freely from re-
spondent to respondent. As a result, open-ended questions are preferable when the goal of the
researcher is to describe the actual content of the decision makers' judgment process, espe-
cially in the early stages of research.
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conclusion of each interview, the interviewer reviewed his or her notes and
entered the respondent's answers to each of the questions into a computer
database.
We analyzed the open-ended questions using both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies. Our interviewees' narratives were converted
first into descriptive tables listing behaviors and qualifiers for those behav-
iors and then into decision process flowcharts for quantitative analysis. We
used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies because the multiple
method approach to research results in a more accurate and vivid portrayal
of the human experience.1'3 First, the interviewers recorded the three types
of behaviors for each respondent: (1) those that the interviewee considered
to be definitely harassing; (2) those that did not reach a level of sexual har-
assment; and (3) those that were ambiguous behaviors. Examples of har-
assing behaviors were "inappropriate touching," "telling dirty/sexual jokes,"
and "making sexual advances." Examples of non-harassing behaviors were
"appropriate touching," "telling dirty/sexual jokes," and "requests for a
date." Examples of ambiguous behaviors were "touching," "making sexual
advances," and "complimenting a woman."
We found that many of our participants mentioned the same behaviors
in all three categories and we were able to interpret their answers only in the
context of the reasons they gave for why the behaviors fell into a particular
category. For example, female interviewee Number 5 mentioned
"touching" as a behavior which could be harassing, non-harassing, or am-
biguous depending upon the context within which the behavior occurred.
She considered touching of a personal body part, "breast or buttocks," in
the workplace to be harassment-regardless of the status of the person
touching the woman (i.e., boss or coworker). On the other hand, she con-
sidered touching of a non-personal body part, "just on the back or arm,"
ambiguous when done by the boss and not harassing when done by a co-
worker. The descriptive context surrounding the behaviors enabled the re-
search team to map out the respondents' complex decision processes when
categorizing social sexual workplace conduct.
The research team recorded all circumstances that the respondents
mentioned as qualifying as any of the three types of behaviors. A qualifier
was defined as any reason that the respondent provided for calling a behav-
ior harassing, non-harassing, or ambiguous. Examples of responses which
qualified behaviors as harassing include: This behavior is sexual harassment
because (1) it makes the woman feel uncomfortable; (2) it happens in the
work setting; and (3) the woman does not want the behavior. Examples of
113. For arguments endorsing the multiple methodologies of combined qualitative and
quantitative research paradigms, see for example QUALITATIVE AND QUANTrrATIVE MEHODS
IN EVALUATION RESEARCH (Thomas D. Cook & Charles S. Reichardt eds., 1979); 3 MICHAEL
Q. PATTON, EVALUATION AND PROGRAM PLANNING MAKING MErHODS CHOICES (1980); Lee J.
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responses which qualified behaviors as non-harassing include: This behav-
ior is not sexual harassment because (1) the man and woman are friends; (2)
it does not violate workplace norms; and (3) the man did not intend to harm
the woman. Finally, examples of qualifiers of ambiguous categories in-
clude: (1) the woman does not know the man's intentions; (2) the behavior
starts out reasonable but the man takes it too far; and (3) it is not directed
toward a particular woman.
Next, we collapsed across all 50 interviewees' coded narratives to cre-
ate six sets of tables, three separate tables for men and three for women.
For each gender we included a summary table for harassing behaviors, non-
harassing behaviors, and ambiguous behaviors. Each entry included the in-
terviewee number, the type of behavior mentioned, an example, and attach-
ments for all qualifying information. Qualifying information included the
circumstances surrounding the behavior, the relevance of the status of the
people involved in the social sexual conduct, the relevance of the frequency
of occurrence of that behavior, and the reason the behavior was harassing,
non-harassing or ambiguous. As an example of a table entry, consider fe-
male respondent Number l's response in our table of sexually harassing be-
haviors. Listed as a type of behavior was touching at the office, with the ex-
ample "when a man squeezes you in the office." The circumstances she
mentioned surrounding this behavior were "it is inappropriate so it is always
sexual harassment." Respondent Number 1 believed that status of the man
(boss vs. coworker) was irrelevant for categorizing this behavior. She
commented on the frequency of the behavior with the following language,
"once makes it harassment." The reason why she thought inappropriate
touching was harassing was that "the average guy should know not to do
this without being told." In each of the six tables we entered data lines
similar to this one but each described a unique combination of gender by
harassing, non-harassing, or ambiguous conduct. There were multiple en-
tries for each respondent because most respondents reported several behav-
iors in each category. We used the data entries in the six tables to construct
flowcharts to represent the decision structures for each behavior that each
respondent mentioned.
A decision flowchart is defined as a detailed graphic representation of a
sequence of hierarchical decision points leading to a judgment regarding
which category (i.e., harassing, non-harassing, or ambiguous) best fits a
particular behavior. We adopted a social inference model ' 14 to outline and
examine this decision making process. The model enables the researcher to
describe hierarchical decision points that capture the respondents' judg-
ments of social sexual conduct. Previously, one of the authors used this ap-
proach to outline a normative theory of negligence decisions."5 In general,
114. See SusAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNrrION 346-404 (2d ed.
1991) (explaining that a social inference model is the sequence of decision points and judg-
ments that a decision maker goes through to reach an inference about another individual).
115. See Wiener, Social Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 88. (A hierarchical flow-
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hierarchical social inference models permit a great deal of precision while
allowing for maximum flexibility in describing legally relevant judgments.
To complete the flowcharts, we pictorially represented behaviors by
large circles, decision points by diamonds, and categories of harassment by
small circles ("S.H." representing sexual harassment, "N.S.H." representing
not sexual harassment, and "AMB" representing ambiguous). Recall that
many behaviors were mentioned in more than one category and some were
even listed in all three categories by the same respondent. The research
team used the information the participants provided in their comments con-
cerning the circumstances surrounding the behaviors, the status of the indi-
viduals involved, the frequency of the behaviors, and the reasons why the
behaviors fit one of the three categories to trace each respondents' judgment
process and thereby created the decision points that connect behaviors to the
final judgment categories (i.e., harassing, non-harassing, or ambiguous).
As an example of one of the flowcharts, let us turn again to female in-





Female Interviewee No. 1
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She mentioned five behaviors in her interview. These were
"touching," "failure to promote," "demeaning nicknames," "telling dirty
jokes," and "winking." Her only decision criterion for the behavior
"touching" was "is it inappropriate?" You will remember from our discus-
sion of this interviewee's table entry above, that she reported the behavior
"touching" to be harassing only if it was inappropriate for the workplace.
Her reason for this was that "the average guy should know not to do this
without being told." Another behavior she mentioned was "failure to pro-
mote." Her only decision criterion for this behavior was "is the promotion
based upon a woman's appearance?" If it was, then she judged the behavior
to be sexual harassment. If it was not, then she judged the behavior was not
harassing. In her interview she stated that "promoting a woman because of
her appearance or not promoting a woman because she doesn't look sexy
enough is always sexual harassment. The average boss should know not to
do this without being told." The next behavior mentioned by interviewee
Number 1 was "demeaning nicknames-like men calling women at the of-
fice.., girls." She used no decision points for this behavior, stating that no
matter what the circumstances, this behavior was ambiguous because "tis
is a common behavior with vague implications which might be thought by
some to be sexual harassment, or it might just be something that bothers
me." In her interview regarding ambiguous behaviors, she listed "winking."
Her decision process about "winking" was "if the winking was constant and
occurred every time the woman encountered the man" then it would be har-
assment, otherwise, it was ambiguous. Finally, interviewee Number l's
most complex decision process involved the behavior "telling dirty jokes."
For this behavior, her first decision point was "if the behavior is done in a
casual setting such as at the water cooler or in the lunchroom" then it is not
sexual harassment. She also stated that "telling dirty jokes is not harass-
ment if it is among coworkers." Finally, she said that "if the boss tells an
infrequent joke it would not be harassment." "However, if the boss told a
joke a day, or if he never quit doing it, then it would be harassment."
After creating a flowchart of behaviors and decision points for each in-
terviewee, we began statistical analyses of the decision making process by
counting occurrences of each type of behavior and each type of common
decision point that the men and women reported. Table 1 illustrates the re-
sults of the tabulations for the behaviors. Table 1 suggests that men and
women are concerned with similar actions. However, our later analyses
show that interpretations of these behaviors vary significantly by gender.
[Vol. 34
28
California Western Law Review, Vol. 34 [1997], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss1/4
SOCIAL SEXUAL CONDUCT AT WORK
Table 1: Types of Social Sexual Conduct Mentioned Most Often by Male
and Female Interviewees
Men Women
Behavior # ofTimes Behavior # of Times
Mentioned Mentioned
Touching 21 Touching 24
Date Requests 15 Comments on Appearance 17
Comments on Appearance 9 Dirty Jokes 12
Dirty Jokes 8 Nicknames 6
Quid pro quo 8 Sexually Explicit Talk 5
Sexually Explicit Talk 7 Quid pro quo 4
Lewd Comments 5 Dirty Pictures 4
Innuendoes 4 Innuendoes 4




Note: The behaviors listed above include only those listed as harassing, non-
harassing, or ambiguous by four or more people."6
Table 2 illustrates the most commonly mentioned types of qualifiers or
decision points that our respondents used to make their judgments. Entries
in Table 2 are expressed in the form of the questions that our respondents
appeared to ask as they classified behaviors as harassing, non-harassing, or
ambiguous. For example, the entry "wanted?"" refers to the question, "Was
the behavior wanted by the woman?"; the entry, "coworker?" refers to the
question, "Was the behavior initiated by a coworker (as opposed to a super-
visor)?"; the entry "woman targeted?" refers to the question, "Was the be-
havior targeted toward a particular woman?"; and the entry "benign intent?"
refers to the question, "Were the man's intentions benign?" As illustrated in
116. The behaviors not listed in this table which were mentioned by men were: dirty
pictures (3), gossip (2), winking (2), derogatory comments (2), criticism (1), teasing (1),
joking (1), nicknames (1), personal questions (1), treating women as helpless (1), contacting a
woman outside of work (1), practical jokes (1), lunch invitations (1), discussing personal re-
lationships (1), and whistling (1). The behaviors not listed in this table which were men-
tioned by women were: flirting (3), leering (3), requests for a date (2), teasing (2), joking (2),
dating the boss (2), invading personal space (2), lewd comments (2), compliments (1), gossip
(1), lunch invitations (1), discussing personal relationships (1), failure to promote (1), re-
quests for personal favors (1), sexist comments (1), and backrubs (1).
117. We use the word "wanted" instead of the more legally accurate language
"welcomed" because our respondents tended to talk about "wanted" and "unwanted" behav-
iors. In fact, no respondent used the words "welcomed" or "unwelcomed."
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Figure 1 above, each decision point requires a "yes" or "no" response. Ta-
ble 2 shows that men relied most often on the decision points: "Was the be-
havior wanted by the woman?"; "Did the behavior stop upon request?; and
"Was the behavior initiated by a coworker?" On the other hand, women re-
lied upon, 'Were the man's intentions benign?"; "Was the behavior initiated
by a coworker?"; and "Did the behavior stop upon request?".
Table 2: Decision Points Used Most Often by Male and Female
Interviewees
Men Women
Decision # of Times Decision # of Times
Point Mentioned Point Mentioned
Wanted? 32 Benign Intent? 31
Stop upon Request? 27 Coworker? 17
Coworker? 20 Stop upon Request? 12
Benign Intent? 12 Infrequent? 8
In frequent? 10 Woman Targeted? 8
Inappropriate? 9 Inappropriate? 6
Degrading? 5 Personal Body Parts? 6
Woman Targeted? 4 In the Workplace? 5
Note: The decision points listed here were mentioned four or more times."'
In order to examine in more detail gender differences in men's and
women's decision criteria for sexual harassment judgments, we developed
four ratios that represented four common decision points (e.g., "Was the
behavior wanted by the woman?"; "Were the man's intentions benign?";
"Was the behavior initiated by a coworker [or a supervisor]?" and "Did the
man stop upon request?"). For each interviewee, we calculated the total
number of decision points and the total number of each type of decision
point (i.e., wanted?, benign intent?, coworker?, and stop upon request?) that
each respondent used. We expressed this value as a percentage with the to-
tal number of decision points as the denominator and the number of a par-
ticular type of decision point as the numerator. We averaged the ratio
(percentage scores) scores separately across the 25 men and the 25 women
in our sample. In this manner, we calculated means of the rate of benign
118. Decision points used by men fewer than four times were: personal body parts? (3),
violate workplace norms? (3), workplace setting? (3), sexual? (3), intentional? (3), aggressive
(2), woman incompetent? (1), woman uncomfortable? (1), man married? (1), woman of-
fended? (1), behavior reciprocated? (1), okay for TV? (1), dirty? (1), male dominated work-
place? (1). Decision points used by women fewer than four times were: woman uncomfort-
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intention decisions to total decision point, the rate of wanted decisions to
total decision points, the rate of coworker decisions to total decision points
and the rate of stop upon request decisions to total decision points. Table 3
lists the means for men and women."9
Table 3: Decision Ratios for Male and Female Interviewees
Ratio Men Women
"Was the behavior
wanted by the woman?" .19* .01*
"Were the man's
intentions benign?" .08* .26*
"Was the behavior
initiated by a coworker?" .10 .16
"Did the man stop upon
request?" .14 .11
Note: * indicates that the men's and women's values are different
from each other at the .01 level of significance.
Statistical analyses indicated that while men more than women used
"Was the behavior wanted by the woman?", women more than men relied
upon "Were the man's intentions benign?" as decision points. Finally, there
were no significant gender differences in the use of 'Was the behavior initi-
ated by a coworker?" or "Did the man stop upon request?" as a decision
point.' The decision structures of both women and men included these lat-
ter two decision points at a rate of between 10 and 16 percent of all the deci-
sion points used. These results show that men focused more on whether the
behavior was wanted by the woman when making a judgment about the har-
assing status of social sexual behavior. Consider, for example, male inter-
viewee Number 27 who discussed two behaviors as sexually harassing in
119. Ratios were used to control for possible differences in the total number of decision
points used by men and women.
120. A 2 (Gender: Male, Female) x 4 (Type of Decision: Wanted, Intentions, Coworker,
Stop upon Request) Mixed Analysis of Variance with Gender as the between subjects factor
and Type of Decision as the within subjects factor was performed to see if there were any
significant differences between men's and women's decision strategies regarding social sex-
ual conduct. We used the Huynh-Feldt correction for degrees of freedom for all within sub-
jects effects. Results indicated that there were no overall gender effects, F (1, 47) = 0.10, ns,
or type of decision effects, F (3, 141) = 1.13, ns. However, there was a significant gender by
decision type interaction, F (3, 141) = 7.78, p < .001. Simple effects tests of this interaction
revealed that men used the decision point, "Was the behavior wanted by the woman?" more
than women, F (1, 47) = 20.02, p < .01; and that women used the decision point, "Were the
man's intentions benign (friendly)?" more than men, F (1, 47) = 9.03, p < .01. There were no
significant differences between men and women's use of "Was the behavior initiated by a
coworker?" F (1, 47) = 1.40, ns or "Did the man stop upon request?", F (1, 47) = .40, ns.
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his interview. These were "touching" and "commenting on a woman's ap-
pearance." He judged these behaviors to be sexually harassing "if they were
unwanted by the woman involved." Male interviewee Number 35 listed
"touching" and "requests for dates" as possible harassing behaviors. He
stated that "once a woman has made it clear to the man that the behavior is
not wanted, continued occurrence of the behavior is harassment." We con-
clude that many men try to ascertain whether a woman wants a social sexual
behavior to occur before determining whether the behavior constitutes sex-
ual harassment.
On the other hand, many women look to the intent of the man involved
when judging whether a behavior is harassing or not. For example, female
interviewee Number 8 mentioned three behaviors as not sexual harassing.
These were "using nicknames like 'dear' or 'honey' at the office,"
"comments about a woman's clothes," and "friendly, non-sexual touching."
She stated that "intention determines if a behavior is harassment or not-
friendly intent is not sexual harassment." She concluded that the three
mentioned behaviors were not harassing if the man's intentions were be-
nign. Similarly, female interviewee Number 12 listed "telling dirty jokes"
and "sexual innuendo" as not sexually harassing. She said, "these are
friendly office behaviors. The man's intention is to be friendly, a camarade-
rie thing, so they are not harassment."
To explore the hypothesis that women's decision rules are more likely
to culminate in harassment conclusions, we calculated a ratio of the number
of sexual harassment judgments divided by the number of non-harassment
judgments for each of our interviewees. Statistical analysis revealed that
women (Mean = 1.57) had significantly higher ratios of harassing to non-
harassing behaviors than men (Mean = .87)."' In fact, while the women
were almost 1.6 times more likely to judge behavior samples as harassing as
opposed to non-harassing, men were about 1.15 times more likely to judge
behavior samples as non-harassing as opposed to harassing. These data lend
direct support to the conclusion that women use broader or more inclusive
harassment definitions and men use narrower or less inclusive harassment
definitions. However, the variance within women (S = 2.36) was signifi-
cantly greater than the variance within men (S = .17 )" suggesting that
women, as compared to men, show much greater latitude with regard to how
broadly they define harassment. In other words, while there is a great deal
of disagreement among women in their harassment judgments, there is
much less disagreement among men.
After completing the statistical analyses of the flowcharts and decision
making process, the research team looked at the different ways in which
men and women made decisions regarding social sexual behaviors in the
121. An independent t-test of gender by ratio of harassing to non-harassing behaviors
was significant, t (1, 48) = 2.21, p = .032.
122. Levene's test for equality of variances produced an F(1,48) = 18.55,p <.001.
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workplace. We chose one woman's flowchart and one man's flowchart to
illustrate decision processes that frame broad definitions of sexual harass-
ment. A broad definition is one that includes many behaviors as sexually
harassing because it consists of more decision points that lead to judgments
of sexual harassment than decision points that lead to judgments of not sex-
ual harassment. We also selected one woman's flowchart and one man's
flowchart that illustrate narrow definitions of sexual harassment. A narrow
definition consists of many decision paths that culminate in judgments of
non-harassment, but few that lead to harassment.
Figure 2
Male with a broad
definition of harassment
Figure 2 is an example of a man with a broad definition of harassment.
It shows seven decision points leading to a judgment of sexual harassment
and only five ways in which a behavior can be judged as not harassment.
Looking more closely at this decision process, one can see that this respon-
dent considers "treating a woman as helpless," "leering" and "derogatory
comments" all to be sexual harassment if they do not stop upon request. If
these behaviors do stop upon request, he does not judge them to be non-
harassing, but merely considers them ambiguous. "Requests for a date" are
sexual harassment if the woman does not accept the date and the man does
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not stop asking her upon request. This respondent sees "Flirting" as sexual
harassment if the intent is not benign and the man does not stop flirting with
the woman when asked. "Flirting" does not constitute harassment if the in-
tent is benign or if the flirting stops upon request, but merely becomes am-
biguous. Finally, the man, with a broad definition of harassment, has a com-
plex decision making process regarding "touching." If the touching is
accidental, then he judges it as non-harassing. If it is not accidental, but is
"wanted," then it is also non-harassing. If the touch is not accidental and
not wanted, and the intent is not benign, then he sees it as harassing. If the
intent is benign and the touching does not stop upon request, again it is har-
assing. However, if it does stop upon request, then it is not harassing. One
can see from this man's flowchart that his decision analysis includes more
harassing paths than non-harassing decision outcomes.
The man with a narrow definition (See Figure 3) of sexual harassment
has only three paths leading to a judgment of harassment and 13 paths
leading to a judgment of not harassment.
Figure 3
Male with a narrow
definition of harassment
"Promotions based upon sexual favors,' "intentional bumping" and
123. We used the language of the participants, "promotions based upon sexual favors"
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"lewd comments" are the only behaviors he finds sexually harassing. In
fact, for the behaviors, "lunch invitations," "practical jokes," "derogatory
comments," and "winks," there is no path leading to sexual harassment. If
both the man and the woman are not participating in the behavior, and the
boss initiates the behavior, and it occurs repeatedly, this man merely judges
these behaviors to be ambiguous. He never considers these behaviors to be
harassing. Therefore, his decision tree displays a narrow definition of sex-
ual harassment because it includes few paths leading to sexual harassment
and many paths leading to a judgment of not sexual harassment.
Figure 4 presents our example of a woman with a broad definition of
harassment. It shows four decision points that lead to a judgment of sexual
harassment and only one that culminates in a behavior that is not harassing.
This woman sees "sexual advances" and "promotions based upon sexual fa-
vors" to always constitute sexual harassment. She judges "touching of a
personal body part" and "telling dirty jokes targeted to a particular woman"
to be sexual harassment. It is only when "dirty jokes" are not targeted to a
particular woman" and the "woman can leave the area!' that this respondent
views off color comments as non-harassing. Finally, "staring," "touching of
a non-personal body part," and "telling dirty jokes which are not targeted to





Female with a broad
definition of harassment
rather than the legal term quid pro quo.
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Our analysis shows that this woman exhibits a broad definition of sexual
harassment. That is, her decision tree includes many paths leading to a
judgment of harassment and few paths leading to non-harassment.
The woman with a narrow definition of harassment (See Figure 5) has
four paths leading to sexual harassment and 11 paths leading to not harass-
ment. This interviewee views "telling dirty jokes" or "sexual innuendoes"
as harassment only when the woman is alone, and the man's intent is not
friendly, and he does not stop when asked. 'Touching" and "sexual ad-
vances" are sexual harassment only if the woman does not want the behav-
iors and the man is touching a personal body part. Otherwise, these behav-
iors are non-harassing. "Asking for a date" and "compliments on
appearance" with "unfriendly intent" are ambiguous. In short, this woman
views very few behaviors as sexual harassment compared to the behaviors




Female with a narrow
definition of harassment
As we have already shown, men and women had somewhat different
decision structures for making judgments of sexual harassment. Table 1
shows that the four most frequently mentioned behaviors by both genders
were "touching at work" (N=45), "making comments on physical appear-
ance" (N=26), "telling dirty jokes" (N=20), and "sexually explicit talk"
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(N=12)."2 Figures 6 through 9 illustrate some common differences in the
decision structures that specific men and women used to evaluate these be-
haviors. These flowcharts were selected as examples of common decision
structures that some individual men and woman used to evaluate the four
most frequently mentioned behaviors. The research team counted the num-
ber of each type of decision point used in the decision structure for each of
these behaviors. Next, we ranked the decision points based upon their fre-
quency of use. The results of this ranking determined the examples of spe-
cific decision trees we selected to represent the most common types of deci-
sion structures. After determining the most frequently occurring decision
points, we selected as examples some male and female flowcharts with de-
cision strategies that best captured the most frequently used decision points.
Figure 6
Decision Structures for Touching at Work
Female Example Male Examples
124. Eight of the male respondents and four of the female respondents listed
"promotions based upon sexual favors" as harassing behavior. Therefore, there were a total
of twelve people who mentioned this behavior. Only one respondent qualified the conduct.
All the rest automatically categorized it as sexually harassing. (See Figures 3 and 4 for exam-
ples of these decision structures.) The one woman who did qualify this behavior suggested
that it is harassment if it happens more than once. We did not create a representative decision
tree for this behavior because there is no decision point involved. Further, this behavior
would result in a quid pro quo cause of action and we limit our discussion in this essay to
hostile work environment violations of Title VII.
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For example, Figure 6 displays the most common decision strategy
women employed to describe "touching at work" and the two most common
decision trees that captured the men's analyses. One can see that this
woman focuses on which part of her body is being touched, and then looks
at the intent of the man touching her to make her harassment decision. On
the other hand, these two men either look to whether the behavior is un-
wanted or whether it is inappropriate for the workplace and stops upon re-
quest when they make harassment judgments.
The decision structures for "comments on physical appearance" indi-
cate (See Figure 7) that our female example first decides whether the com-
ment is a compliment, then whether the intent of the man complimenting
her is friendly, then whether he is a coworker, and finally, if the behavior
stops upon request. The male representatives make their decisions about
this behavior in one of two ways. One structure begins with whether the
man's intent is friendly, and then asks whether the man is the woman's co-
worker. The other example begins with whether the comment is made in
the work setting and then continues by assessing whether the comment is
wanted by the woman.
Figure 7
Decision Structures for Comments on Physical Appearance
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The decision structures for "telling dirty jokes" show (See Figure 8)
that our representative woman when making harassment judgments looks to
whether the woman is alone, whether the intent of the man telling the joke is
friendly, and whether he stops when asked. The man representing this deci-
sion structure focuses on whether the intent of the man telling the joke is
friendly and if the purpose of telling the joke is sexual.
Figure 8
Female Example
Decision Structures for Telling Dirty Jokes
Male Example
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The final example of the decision structures for a behavior that both
men and women mentioned frequently is "sexually explicit talk." Figure 9
shows the female examples go to either the intent of the man, or whether the
man stops upon request, while the male examples focus either on the intent
of the man or on whether the woman wants the behavior.
Figure 9
Decision Structures for Sexually Explicit Talk
Female Examples Male Examples
The last two figures analyze behaviors that were common to men or
women but not both. Figure 10 gives examples of the common decision
structures our representative men used to judge harassment with regard to
"requests for a date." Figure 11 gives examples of representative decision
structures women used in judging harassment for "nicknames." It is inter-
esting to note that 15 of the 25 men (60%) interviewed and only two of the
25 women (8%) mentioned "requests for a date" when asked about social
sexual conduct in the workplace. Six women (24%) and only one man (4%)
mentioned "nicknames" during their interviews.
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Figure 10
Examples of Males' Decision Structures for Requests for a Date
Requests for Requests for
a date a date
Does the Yf t , Does the r e
woman accept woman accept ndS.He
(Wanted) ' (wanted)
N N
Y Stopupon .~(;I; ~ Souo
Coworker 4- request reqSopuponst
requesting the date is a coworker and he stops when asked, then the behav-
ior is ambiguous, but not harassment. On the other hand if he does not stop,
then the behavior is harassment. It is also harassment if the boss requests
the date and the woman does not want to be asked. The other male decision
structure for "requests for a date" was more commonly used by our inter-
viewees. In this decision tree, if the woman accepts the date, it is not har-
assment. If she does not accept, but the man stops asking upon request, it is
also not harassment. If he does not stop upon request, then the behavior is
ambiguous, but still not harassment. It was unusual for the men in our sam-
ple to find "requests for a date" harassing.
There are two female examples of decision structures for "calling a
woman a nickname at work." If the intent of the man is friendly, then it is
not harassment. If the intent is not friendly, then most women judged
"nicknames" to be ambiguous. The only way that "nicknames" become
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harassing is if they are demeaning to the woman.
Figure 11
Examples of Females' Decision Structures for Nicknames
N0
IV. CONCLUSION
In Part III we used social analytic investigation to assess the fit between
the normative model of social sexual conduct at work embodied in harass-
ment law and the manner in which a sample of men and women workers
actually make harassment judgments. We found that although men and
women are concerned with similar types of conduct, they interpreted the be-
haviors somewhat differently. The judgment strategies of both genders con-
sidered together tend to include as important decision points: 1) Was the be-
havior wanted by the woman?; 2) Were the man's intentions benign?; 3)
Did the behavior stop upon request?; and 4) Was the behavior initiated by a
coworker or a supervisor? However, women focused more on the issue of
the intentions of the man and men looked more to whether the woman wel-
comed the social sexual conduct.
These strategies led to different outcomes in that women were more
likely to find behavior harassing and men were more likely to find behavior
non-harassing. In other words, women used broader definitions of harass-
ment and men used narrower definitions. Equally important, we found
much greater variability among women as compared to men with regard to
the breadth of the definition of harassment. In short, the men in our sample
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consistently used narrow definitions of harassment and some women used
narrow definitions, while other women relied upon much broader defini-
tions. Our flowcharts illustrate how many different ways men and women
workers make these judgments. The rule seems to be that workers rely on
very different types of decision strategies to reach their judgments and as a
result there is great disagreement about the conditions that render behaviors
offensive (and therefore costly). In other words, it is not the conduct per se
that results in perceptions of harassment but rather it is the interaction of
conduct and circumstances. For the most part the respondents' judgments
were rational, but very subjective. They were rational in the sense that
women and men followed implicit but discoverable rules when evaluating
social sexual conduct at work and they were subjective in that the rules
themselves varied extensively within and between genders.
Our data suggest that current hostile work environment law in some
ways fits the judgment processes of our interviewees well and in some ways.
fits it poorly. The normative model found in the law is based upon five as-
sumptions about sexual harassment: 1) the conduct is unwelcome; 2) the
conduct is severe (and/or); 3) the conduct is pervasive; 4) the conduct is of-
fensive from an objective and subjective point of view; z and 5) the inten-
tions of the alleged harasser are secondary."' We conducted interviews to
assess the fit between the normative model assumed in the law and the
manner in which full time workers evaluate social sexual conduct on the
job. We found that workers rely on unwelcomeness ('Was the behavior
wanted by the woman?"), pervasiveness ("Did the man stop upon re-
quest?"), and the intentions of the man ('"Were the man's intentions be-
nign?") to reach their decisions. It is perhaps no surprise to some that men
in our sample were more concerned about the welcomeness status of social
sexual conduct than were women. It could be argued that the men used de-
terminations of welcomeness to justify what otherwise might be offensive
conduct. However, it might also be the case that men have learned to pay
close attention to the welcomeness factor in order to better monitor the ap-
propriateness of their own actions. In any case, our data draw into question
the conclusion that welcomeness determinations should have less weight in
harassment policy. The unwelcomeness evaluation does not automatically
favor the complainant and in fact results from a rather a complex judgment
process.
Our data suggest that the decision process is indeed a subjective one.
There is great variation between men and women and within both genders
with regard to the definition of harassment. It is doubtful that an enumer-
ated code of conduct could be used to regulate social sexual behavior in the
workplace because the offensiveness of behavior varies considerably by
125. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872 (9th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
126. Because the law is modeled after tort decisions, the psychological motivation of the
accused harasser is not considered as an element in the final judgment.
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gender. Further, while men and women used the power status of the actors
("Was the behavior initiated by a coworker?") as a decision criterion, they
weighed power no more than any of the other decision points. We did not
find that women were more sensitive to the power relationship than were
men. Apparently, power considerations may not be as important in the
evaluation of workplace social sexual conduct as some would argue.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that a gender-neutral standard (the rea-
sonable person test of severity and pervasiveness) can capture the subjectiv-
ity that we found in our flowcharts. It is also doubtful that the reasonable
woman standard without further clarification can offset gender differences
in these judgments and perceptions." The reasonable woman standard pre-
sented as an abstract construct with little definition is not likely to provide
very much guidance in the assessment of social sexual conduct for men and
women in the workplace or in the jury box. However, as we have argued
elsewhere, presenting empirically based definitions of reasonableness from
a woman's perspective offers great promise as a solution to this problem."
Such a definition of reasonableness would need to take into consideration
the considerable variability in decision strategies that we have outlined in
this essay. Some empirical average of narrow and broad definitions of har-
assing conduct as displayed by women workers in our sample will need to
be developed.
Although the law considers the severity of the conduct as an important
criterion, our respondents did not show much variation in their reactions to
behaviors per se. They found quid pro quo conduct to be harassing without
qualification but we could find no observable patterns that tied severity of
the behavior to judgments of hostile work environment harassment. Instead,
the men based their decisions more on welcomeness and the women more
on the perceived intent of the men.
Any reforms in hostile work environment law should consider restruc-
turing the test to emphasize more the intentionality of the accused and de-
emphasize the role of the severity of the conduct. In other words, so called
benign behaviors may be considered more offensive under certain situations
than so called severe behaviors, and severe behaviors may result in less per-
ceived harassment than mild behaviors delivered with hostile intent. Un-
questionably, some behaviors (i.e., quid pro quo and criminal actions such
as sexual assault or rape) are automatically offensive, however the offen-
siveness of other behaviors depends more upon "Was the behavior wanted
by the woman?"; 'Were the man's intentions benign?"; "Was the behavior
initiated by a coworker?"; or "Did the man stop upon request?" than upon
the absolute severity of the conduct.
Our data suggest that not all uninvited social sexual conduct is costly to
127. See Wiener et al., Reasonable Woman, supra note 64; Wiener, Sexual Harassment,
supra note 64.
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women. It is clear that some of the women workers in our sample viewed
behavior that was unwanted as harassment, but others were more concerned
with the intentions of the men initiating the conduct. We would find it very
difficult to conclude that all rational women would assign similar
cost/benefit structures to social sexual conduct at work. Instead, we must
conclude that the judgment of cost is a subjective evaluation. There are dif-
ferences between men and women and among women that need to be taken
into consideration when establishing the costs of even unwelcome social
sexual conduct at work. There is a great deal to be learned by investigating
in more detail the cost/benefit structures that female and male workers as-
sign to these behaviors. Any construction of a rational woman standard"9
should be based upon the results of such investigations.
Like all social science investigations, ours has identifiable limitations.
Our work requires extension and replication. Admittedly, our sample of 50
workers needs to be enlarged to include more respondents and our interview
methods should be corroborated with alternative methodologies. Nonethe-
less, we believe this essay has opened the door to an entirely different ap-
proach to studying social sexual conduct at work and ultimately hostile
work environment harassment. We used social analytic jurisprudence to
identify some of the naturally occurring decision processes of workers. We
did not try to extend the list of behaviors that constitute harassing or non-
harassing conduct, but rather we focused on the judgment strategies of
women and men who inhabit everyday work environments. Learning more
about how common folk make these judgments can only enhance our under-
standing of harassment in the workplace and possibly offer some solutions
to the problem. The challenge to psycholegal scholarship is to educate the
law and employers by describing actual behavior rather than presumed nor-
mative models of social sexual conduct at work. Social analytic jurispru-
dence is especially well suited to help us achieve this objective.
129. See Hadfield, supra note 81.
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